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Abstract
Subregional  trade arrangements  (RTAs) in Eastern and  Pacific  group (ACP),  signed the Cotonou Agreement with
Southern Africa have  proliferated in the past 10 to 15  the European Union, which  includes the negotiation  of
years. The small size of most of the countries in the  economic partnership  agreements  (EPAs) between  the EU
region, some of which are  landlocked, and the security  and the ACP. The Cotonou Agreement  explicitly leaves
needs in the post independence period  largely explain  to the ACP countries to decide the level and procedures
the rapid  expansion. These arrangements are  of the EPA trade negotiations,  taking into account the
characterized  by multiple  and overlapping memberships,  regional  integration  process.  This raises the  question of
complex structures,  and eventually,  conflicting  and  how to decide on the groupings  in the context of
confusing commitments.  The  influence of RTAs  has been  conflicting regional trade agendas.  De la Rocha argues
limited to assisting the region in increasing trade,  that the Cotonou Agreement and EPA negotiations could
attracting foreign direct investment,  enhancing growth,  become the external driving force  that will push the
and achieving convergence  among member countries.  regional organizations to rationalize  and harmonize their
But despite their limitations, RTAs  have the potential,  if  regional  trade arrangements,  thus strengthening the
properly designed  and effectively  implemented, to be an  integration  process and economies  of the region,  and
important instrument in integrating member countries  assisting the Eastern and Southern Africa region  in
into global markets.  In  1'998 most of the Southern  becoming a more active  partner in the global economy.
African  countries,  as members  of the Africa Caribbean
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Introduction
One of the recent  key characteristics  that define  the process  of economic  integration  in
the  Eastern and  Southern Africa  (ESA) region3  is the  development  and proliferation  of
overlapping  and  inconsistent  regional  trade  agreements,  namely  the  Southern  African
Customs Union (SACU),  Southern African Development Community (SADC), Common
Market  of Eastern  and  Southern  Africa  (COMESA)  and  the  East  African  Community
(EAC).  These  arrangements  are  supplemented  by other  regional  arrangements  such  as
Regional Investment Facilitation Forum (RIFF) and the Common Monetary Area (CMA)
and others  that,  although of a non-trade nature,  have  economic  integration  among their
main objectives,  such  as the  Indian  Ocean  Commission  (IOC).  As  shown  in Figure  1,
most of the countries  in the region belong  to at least two of these  regional  groups.  For
instance,  South  Africa and Botswana  are members  of both SADC  and SACU, Namibia
and Swaziland participate in three regional trade agreements  as well as RIFF4 and are part
of the common monetary  area, Kenya and Uganda  are members  of both COMESA and
EAC.
Figure 1. Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)  in Eastern and Southern Africa
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2  Thanks to Alan Gelb, Enmique Aldaz, Marie-Francoise  Marie-Nelly, Marcelo  Olarreaga, Claire Thirriot
and Lucio Castro for their valuable conmnents.
3 Under ESA region we refer to all countries belonging to COMESA and SADC, namely: Angola,
Botswana, Burundi, Congo DR, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Kenya, Lesotho,  Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique,  Narnibia, Rwanda, Seychelles,  South Afiica, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia
and Zimnbabwe.
4 Previously known as the Cross Border Initiative (CBI)
2The majority of  these RTAs in ESA have proliferated in the past  10 tol5 years. The small
size of most of the countries in the region, some of which are landlocked, and the security
needs  in  the  post  independence  period  largely  explain  the  rapid  expansion.  Their
proliferation  has  occurred not only in the number  of them,  but also  in their variety,  in
terms of objectives, design, and the speed of integration envisaged.
In addition, most countries in the region, especially  in Southern Africa are engaged in or
considering  bilateral  trade  and  investment  agreements.  Malawi,  Mozambique,  and
Zimbabwe  respectively have seven  and eight and ten bilateral  agreements with another
SADC  country.  Angola  has  six, while  South Africa  and  Botswana have  four bilateral
trade  agreements  with  another  SADC  member  state.  Significant  differences  in  the
interpretation  and  enforcement  of the  terms  and  conditions  of  these  bilateral  trade
agreements  represent  an  obstacle  for the  local  industries  serving  markets  covered  by
them.
As a result, despite the strong political rhetoric supporting them, the RTAs have failed to
increase trade, attract foreign direct investment,  enhance growth, or achieve convergence
among the member countries (UNCTAD 2002).  In fact, the region has been marginalized
in  the  global  economy:  it  under-trades,  and  the  degree  to  which  it under trades  has
steadily increased  since  the 1980s  leading to substantial  fall in its  share of world trade
(Gelb  2002).  Reversal  of its  marginalization  in  world  trade  is  essential  to  accelerate
growth,  expand  employment,  and  reduce  poverty  in  the  region.  The  RTAs  can,  if
properly designed and effectively  implemented,  be an important  instrument to assist the
member countries in integrating with global markets.
There  is  a  growing  awareness  of  the  economic  costs,  in  terms  of  efficiency,
administration  and  lack  of transparency,  that the  existing  "spaghetti bowl" imposes  on
many  of the  countries  and  business  in  the  region.  However,  there  are  a  number  of
historical,  political  and  cultural  reasons  that  explain  the  current  configuration  of the
regional  trade  agreements  and  their  membership.  Failure  to  address  these issues  along
with the economic issues have prevented all attempts to rationalize the current RTAs.
A window  of opportunity  is now open for these RTAS through the Cotonou Agreement
recently  signed  between  the  European  Union  and  the  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific
group  (ACP),  which  will  have  very  important  implications  for the regional  integration
process  in Eastem  and Southem African.  Many  authors have  argued that the Economic
and Partnership  Agreements to be negotiated as part of the Agreement  will impose large
costs on developing  countries.  This  paper will argue that,  despite  its risks,  EPAs could
also  generate  very important  benefits  for  Eastern  and  Southem  African  countries  - in
particular their trade-related  and supply side  aspects- but they will not be fully exploited
unless  the region  finally addresses  some of the outstanding issues regarding  its regional
trade agenda. Therefore,  the Cotonou Agreement can be the extemal impulse that leads to
the rationalization of the RTAs.
3The paper is organized  as  follows:  Section  1 briefly presents  an overview  of the main
Regional  Trade Agreements  currently in place in Eastern and Southern Africa;  Section 2
reviews  the  evolution  of trade  flows  and  trade  policies  in the region,  focusing  on  the
development  of intra-regional  trade  for the two main RTAs through  the 90s;  Section  3
looks into some of the main costs and benefits arising from the current configuration  of
regional  trade  agreements  in  the  region;  Section  4  analyses  the  implications  of the
Cotonou  Agreement  for the regional trade agenda  and presents  a proposal to  overcome
some of the main problems affecting the regional trade agreement;  Section 5 presents the
conclusions.
1. An overview  of the Regional Trade Agenda;:
Different historical baclcgrounds,  political agendas and approaches to regional integration
are  behind the  multiplicity of regional  trade  agreements.  The  key features  of the  four
main trade agreements operating in Southern and Eastern Africa are:
*  The South African Development  Community  (SADC)  was established  by the
SADC  Treaty  in  July  1992  when  it  replaced  the  Southern  African  Development
Coordination  Conference  (SADCC),  which  was  a regional  cooperation  forum  against
South  Africa  at  the  tirne  of apartheid.  Currently  SADC  members  are  South  Africa,
Lesotho,  Botswana,  Swaziland,  Namibia,  Angola,  Mozambique,  Zimbabwe,  Zambia,
Malawi, Mauritius,  Seychelles,  Tanzania and Democratic  Republic of Congo (DRC). All
member states have agreed to a Trade Protocol which came into force in September 2000.
It envisages  a SADC Free Trade  Area by 2008.  In the meantime,  SADC countries  are
intending  to trade on preferential  terms  in an asymmetrical  manner under which South
Africa (and indirectly its SACU partners) should open up its market faster than the other
SADC  members.  The  SADC  trade  liberalization  and  integration  program  makes  no
reference  to SADC becoming  a Customs Union in the near future,  and therefore,  for the
moment  the Free  Trade  Area  is  the  deepest  form  of economic  integration  in the  area
among SADC countries.  The calendar  for SADC countries to eliminate its intemal tariffs
is  spread  over  the  2000-2012  period.  However,  in  the  transitory  period,  individual
member states are givern the choice to  implement the trade liberalization  scheme at their
own pace. While the idea of differential  tariff reduction rate is democratic  and members
can be pressured to make good on commitments  that they made voluntarily,  there is the
likelihood that some coumtries may not achieve  the planned  100 per cent tariff reduction
by the deadline date because  they backloaded  the bulk of their tariff cuts and started at a
very low base, e.g., Tanzania (9.2 per cent), Mozambique  (16.9 per cent).
*  The  Southern Africa  Customs  Union  (SACU)  was  established  in its present
form in 1969 and comprises Botswana,  Lesotho, Namibia,  Swaziland, and South Africa.
It is a fully-fledged  customs union with a common extemal tariff,  a centralized customs
administration  (including a central revenue  collection  and sharing mechanism through  a
negotiated and agreed  formula) and a mechanism for intra-SACU consultations. Up until
now  SACU has  no  institutional  setting  and  its tariff rates  are  unilaterally  decided  by
South Africa,  which also collects  all the customs revenues.  In exchange for  yielding  its
trade  policy  to  SA,  the  formula  for  the  distribution  of the  customs  duties  is  more
4favorable  to the four small members,  which receive  a higher proportion of the revenues.
The  five  SACU  members  have  recently  renegotiated  the  agreement  and  reviewed  the
existing formula.
*  The Common  Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is made
up  of  the  following  countries,  Kenya,  Uganda,  Egypt,  Sudan,  Swaziland,  Namibia,
Angola,  Zimbabwe,  Zambia,  Malawi,  Mauritius,  Seychelles,  and DRC.  The COMESA
Treaty was signed in 1994  as a successor for the former Preferential  Trade Area (PTA).
On  October  31,  2000  COMESA  established  a  FTA  with  the  following  countries:
Djibouti,  Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar,  Malawi, Mauritius,  Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
As for  the  rest of the  COMESA  countries,  most of them  grant  important  preferential
access to their markets to the other members, and are planning to join the FTA in the next
few  years.  The next  step  for COMESA  is the  implementation  of a  customs  union  by
2004.  To that end,  a Common External Tariff (CET)  has been agreed with a four-band
tariff  structure  of  0-5-15-30  percentage  points  on  capital  goods,  raw  materials,
intermediate  goods  and  finished  products  respectively.  The  tariffs  may  well  change
before  the  implementation  of the  CET  but  what  is  important  is  that  there  has  been
agreement on the structure of the CET, which has allowed work on the Customs Union to
progress.
*  The East  African  Community  (EAC)  is  formed  by three  countries,  Uganda,
Kenya  and Tanzania.  Its treaty was signed in  1999  and is a revival of the economic  co-
operation  agreement  which  broke  up  in  1977.  The  Treaty  provides  for  a progressive
regional integration process, beginning with formation of a free trade  area and a customs
union within four years of the signing of the Treaty. This will be followed by a Common
Market,  a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation.  EAC has set up a high
task  force  to negotiate  the  details  of the  Customs  Union,  expected  to  be  in place  by
January 2004.
2. Evolution of regional trade flows  in Eastern and Southern Africa
One of the key characteristics of trade links within Eastern and Southern Africa is the low
level of intra-regional  trade  that  takes place  in  the region.  This  section  will  examine
regional  trade  flows  for  SADC  and  COMESA,  which  combined  encompass  all  the
countries in the ESA region. Table  1 shows the change in the main trade destinations and
origin for imports  and exports  for both regional  organizations  between  1991  and  2001.
Evolution of intra-regional  trade flows has been quite different in the two RTAs. While
COMESA  intra-regional  trade  has overall remained marginal  for the member  countries,
representing less than 5 per cent of the total, SADC has seen an increase  in intra-regional
imports  from 6.3 per cent to 9.9 per cent,  and exports  from 7.9  to  13  per cent between
1991 and 2001.
5Table 1. Direction of trade for SADC and COMESA
SADC  TRADE  Exports  Imports
1991  2001  1991  2001
intn.-SAIX  - ~  r  6*  -3%  9.  -%  7;9%
EXtraragIonal'  "  . 9.7%  90.1%  7  92;1%..'  .8T06
Rest of  Africa"**  1.1%  2.7%  1.1%  2.1%
East Asia & Pacfic  16.3%  16.8%  17.0%  20,3%
USA  16.1%  17.6%  11.9%  10.4%
EU  49.1%  43.0%  51.1%  39.4%
Rest of world  11.1%  10.1%  11.0%  14.8%
IToai  Word'  - ,  100%.  tOO%I.:  . P_  A%
COMESA  TRADE  Exports  Import
1991  20011  1991  2001
Intro CC()1ESA  (2u oduPrtitsa  _ 5%  5 4  '  2I9%  m3'.p
ErT_aregl2nal  94.6°  %  97.60%  9W20%
Rest of Africa  3.3%  5.1%  6.0%  9.4%
South Asia  1.9%  2.2%  1.5%  3.3%
East Asia & Pacfik  9.8%  14.5%  14.0%  17.8%
EU  50.8%  39.5%  44.0%  31.7%
USA  16.9%  19.6%  13.6%  14.3%
Rest of world  13.8%  13.7%  18.6%  19.6%
Wnrld  .1%  .100%1  % -r  .C(9%
Source: Yagci and Aldaz-Carroll  (2003)
Despite the fact that intra-regional  trade  as a percent of total trade has more than doubled
during  the  1990s  for  SADC  countries,  participation  in  the  regional  trade  flows  is
completely  unbalanced.  South  Africa  accounts  for  more  than  70  percent  of the  intra-
SADC imports,  enjoying a large trade surplus with the other members,  estimated at more
than  $US4  billion  per  year.  The  BLNS  countries  (Botswana,  Lesotho,  Namibia  and
Swaziland),  Malawi,  Mozambique,  Zambia,  and Zimbabwe  are  the most dependent  on
imports  from  South  Africa.  Simultaneously,  while  South African  exports  to  the region
soared during the 90s, the share of the EU as the main origin of SADC imports decreased
from 44 to 31.7 per cent for SADC and from 51.1  to 39 per cent in the broader COMESA
space. There  may be a case to suggest that the renewed engagement of SA in the region
since the  fall of the  apartheid  regime  in  1994  has  led  to  an important  degree  of trade
diversion from European goods in favors of South African ones.
Overall,  even for SADC, if South African  is not taken into account, trade  flows between
ESA countries  are still substantially  low. Trade  flows between ESA countries reflect the
structure  of production of the countries  that make up  the two regional  groups,  which is
characterized by concentration of exports in a few comunodities  exported to international
markets.  Low  levels  of  intra-regional  trade  are  also  due  to  the  poor  quality  of
infrastructure  and  financial  linkages,  as  well  as  the  restrictions  on  trade and  exchange
regimes  adopted  by most of the countries  in  previous  decades.  Indeed,  in  many ESA
countries,  the  practice  of multiple  exchange  rate  systems,  surrender  requirements  for
6export  proceeds,  high  tariff protection,  restrictive  import  licensing  requirements,  and
other restrictive  non-tariff barriers have limited the scope of intra-regional  trade in the
past. According to the IMF (2000) the overall degree of restrictiveness for the whole ESA
region has been until recently relatively  high;  in the early 1990s  it was  9.7 (on a scale
from  0  to  10,  where  10  indicates  the most  restrictive  regime).  The  situation  has  now
changed to some extent as a result of the liberalization of their trade regimes. The average
overall trade restrictiveness  for the region has fallen from 9.7 to  less than 6 in  1998. In
general,  SADC  countries  are  less  restrictive.  As  of 1998,  nine  out of  14 members  of
SADC (Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South
Africa,  Swaziland,  Mozambique,  and Zambia) had moderately  open or fully open trade
regimes.
Less restrictive and more liberal trade regimes have translated into more open economies.
Tables  1 &  2 present openness  indicators  based on the ratios of exports to GDP  and of
exports plus imports to GDP for SADC and COMESA, respectively,  from 1990 to 2001.
Two  types  of exports and  imports  are  reviewed,  in terms of merchandise  trade  and  in
terms of trade in goods and services.
Table 2. Openess indicators for Eastern and Southern Africa countries (Measured as per cent of GDP)
Mnrchandsn wVs  Mmcrawdse  InVorts  Exgts of goods &  services  In'orts of goods &  services Totl  bade of goods &  servla
1990  1999  1990  1999  1990  1999  1990  1999  1990  1999
Angola  38  83  15  51  39  86  21  95  60  181
Botswan  47  52  52  44  55  28  50  33  106  61
Burund  7  8  20  17  8  9  28  18  36  27
Congo  11  9-  9  61  30  24*  29  22-  59  46
DjlboutI  6  4  51  50  41+  47  58+  61  98  108
Egypt  Arab  6  4  21  18  20  15  33  24  53  39
Eritrea  20++  10  57++  92  77  102
Ethopi  4  16  8  14  12  29  20  43
Kenya  12  17  25  27  26  26  31  31  57  57
Lesoth  10  19  109  86  17  24  122  95  139  119
Malawi  22  24  31  39  24  27  33  42  57  69
Maurflu  45  37  61  53  65  65  72  68  138  133
Mozambiqu  5  7  36  29  8  11  36  37  44  48
Namibi  43  36  46  41  47  49  56  56  102  105
Rwand  4  3  11  13  6  6  14  23  20  28
Seychelle  15  24  50  71  62  74  67  88  129  162
South  21  21  16  21  24  26  19  23  43  49
Sudan  3  8  5  14  8  15  0  23
Swazilan  66  70  79  85  76  74  76  90  152  164
Tanzani  10  6  24  18  13  14  37  26  50  41
Ugand  3  8  5  21  7  11  19  23  27  34
Zambia  40  24  37  22  36  23  37  41  72  64
Zimbabw  20  34  21  39  23  46  23  47  46  93
SADC  31  35  53  54  42  49  58  76  113  128
COMES  20  22  29  33  27  33  32  47  65  80
United  7  8  9  11  10  11  11  13  21  24
Japan  9  9  8  7  10  10  9  8  20  18
EU  22  27  23  26  28  33  28  31  56  64
LatinAmerica&  13  16  11  18  14  16  12  18  26  34
Middle East &  North  32  23  25  20  33  30  35  28  68  58
Sub-Saharan  22  24  19  25  27  28  26  31  53  60
World  16  18  16  19  20  23  20  23  40  46
Nous *v*GCofngoD.P  bdCtl  on19iSvydue
v&uwfutCaWbffon1997vdue
Al  wes gem  wwmed
SoLsYao  aid Aldaz-Cw  (2003)
Independently  of which openness indicator is used, it is clear that SADC  countries have
increased their openness and so has the SADC as a region. For COMESA countries, more
than half of its members  (mostly those  that are  also  members  of SADC)  experienced
r7greater openness  durintg this period, while the remaining  countries  experienced  a fall  in
openness.  Note  that  SADC  countries  and  the  SADC  region  have  greater  levels  of
openness  than other regions  - which is due to the small size of their domestic markets  -
and that  the change  in openness  experienced  during  this period  was greater than most
other regions.
However,  greater openness has not resulted in deeper integration into the global markets,
but  quite  the  opposite.  Figure  2  shows  the  evolution  of exports  from  Eastern  and
Southern Africa as a share of global exports.  As can be observed, ESA region has been
increasingly marginalized from world trade. In 1990, total exports from ESA represented
around  1.05  per cent of total world exports; one decade later in 2002 they were 0.96 per
cent. By RTAs, while  SADC has barely maintained  its share  in world trade,  COMESA
has  seen  its  exports  falling  from  0.59  to  0.44  of world  exports.  The  main  difference
between  the  two groupings  is accounted  for by South Africa,  which exports  increased
notably after the change of regime in  1994.  Overall,  therefore,  for Eastern  and Southern
Africa,  the 90s  can be easily considered  as a  "lost decade" in terms of integration  into
the global economy.
% of Word  Figure 2: Eastern  and Southern Africa (ESA):
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3. Regional  Trade Agreements  in Eastern and Southern Africa: stepping stones or
stumbling blocks  to integration into the world economy?
Data  from  the  previous  section  indicates  that  the  proliferation  of preferential  trade
agreements and the generalized movement towards trade liberalization  in most countries
during the  90s has proven quite ineffective  in substantially increasing  the level of intra-
regional flows. The reality is that most countries in the region may not be natural trading
partners because they have similar factor endowments  and consequently,  tend to  export
and  import similar  goodls  (Wood  and  Mayer  2001).  Similar  factor  endowments  across
8countries  does not necessarily  imply that there is no scope  for trade.  It can be of intra-
industry nature as is the  case for most trade between developed countries  (trade between
USA and EU, or within the EU). However,  this does not fully apply to the ESA region.
Given the preponderance  of primary  commodities  in the  production  and  exports  of the
countries  in the region,  the potential  for  intra-industry  trade  among them  is  somehow
limited.
Yet, trade and market integration can be a very useful strategy to  increase investment in
member  countries  through  their  potential  to  reduce  distortions,  enlarge  markets,  and
enhance the credibility of economic  and political reforms.  Such benefits  are most likely
when  countries  or  their  endowments  are  small,  limiting  market  size.  For  countries  in
Eastern  and  Southern Africa  increased  amounts  of foreign  investment  are  essential  in
order to receive  the  transfer  of technology  and know-how  and to  create  the backward
linkages  with  local  industries  that  will  enable  them  raise  their  productivity  and
competitiveness,  achieve  product  diversification,  expand  trade  in  global  markets  and
ultimately achieve higher growth.  There is evidence that FDI inflows can be induced by
regional  arrangements  in cases  where they can obtain  access  to significant  markets  and
markets of industrialized  countries  (Robson  1998, World Bank 2000).  Smaller countries
lacking  such  links  may  find  themselves  increasingly  marginalized  from  international
capital  flows.  Other  potential  benefits  or  regional  arrangements  include  stronger
commitment  to reforms,  increased bargaining power,  enhanced  cooperation,  and greater
security.  But  theoretical  and  empirical  analyses  show  that  these  benefits  are  neither
automatic nor necessarily large. The bottom line is that regional integration  arrangements
must be viewed as a means  to the end of improving welfare  in participating countries-
not as an end in themselves.
For all this to happen ESA countries must move from the old regional schemes based on
the promotion  of industrial  development  through  import  substitution behind  high tariff
barriers  towards  a new  outward-looking  regionalism  centered  on export  promotion  and
integration  into  global markets.  Hence,  the  main  question  arising  is  how  the regional
economic arrangements present in ESA are contributing to enhance the integration of the
sub-region into  the global  economy,  what are  the main constrains  they present  in their
current fashion and what can be done about it.
Regional  Trade  Agreements  in  ESA  are  considered  to  be  South-South  RTAs.  Recent
literature  shows  that,  although  South-South  RTAs  can  be  particularly  effective  in
encouraging  liberalization  of domestic markets  and removing  invisible barriers  to trade,
they are  more  likely,  if not properly  designed and  effectively  implemented,  to  lead  to
trade diversion  and  asymmetric  distribution of benefits  and  costs,  than  south-north  or
north-north  agreements  (World  Bank  1999).  This  means  that  agreements  between
developing  countries  comprising  a poorer one and  another relatively  richer, with a more
developed  manufacturing  sector,  tend  to  be  more  beneficial  to  the  latter  than  to  the
former.  Typically,  following  the  fall  of preferential  tariff rates  the  least  developed
members  increase  their  imports  of manufactured  products  from  the  more  developed
partners, whose firms may not be internationally competitive.  The most likely outcome is
9that  prices  do  not  fall  and  producers  from  the  exporter  country  capture  most of the
foregone tariff revenue.
Asymmetric  distribution  can also be caused by agglomeration  effects.  Industry  and new
investments tend to concentrate in the more developed member in the regional block once
the trade barriers are removed. If not corrected with a workable compensation mechanism
they  can  generate  tensions  among  members.  Indeed,  past experiences  have  shown  that
perceptions  in many countries  that gains  and costs are very unevenly distributed  easily
result  in the lack of imnplementation  of regional  commitments,  or in the break  up of the
arrangements  in the most extreme  cases.  There  are signs that  such phenomena  of trade
diversion  and  asymmetry  could be  developing  in  the  region particularly  in SACU  and
SADC where as we saw South Africa, the richest country in the region, dominates  trade5
(over  50 percent  of total  intra-block  imports  are  from  South  Africa).  Misgivings  that
Kenya  is reaping  all the benefits  from the  integration  process  have  also bogged  down
negotiations on regional trade liberalization within the EAC.
Given the  fact that the establishment  of structural  funds a la Union European involving
massive  transfers  of funds from the richer  to the poorer  countries  is not something  that
could  be  expected  amrong  developing  countries,  a  key  step  to  minimize  these  trade
diversion or agglomeration  effects is to lower protection  against non-members. The lower
the  marginal  difference  between  world  and domestic  prices  the less  the incentives  for
trade diversion and subsequent transfers  from the poorer to the richer country.
For Eastern and Southern Africa to reap all the benefits of deeper integration and reduce
the risks of trade diversion and agglomeration  it will need to address  sooner rather than
later some of the problems stemming from the conflicting  and overlapping regional trade
agenda.
First,  some  countries  face  conflicting  obligations.  COMESA  plans  to  have  a  customs
union in place by 2004; EAC plans to also have its own customs union and free trade area
in place by 2004; SACIJ is already a customs union; and SADC plans to have a free trade
area in place by 2008. As noted,  a free trade area implies that imports  from one member
of the FTA to another rnember of the FTA are free of duty. On the other hand a customs
union implies  that all countries  belonging to the customs  union apply the same tariffs on
all imports into  the customs  union, meaning that if a product imported  from outside the
customs union  attracts  a duty of 20 per cent then all the countries  in the customs union
must  apply  a duty of 20 per cent  on the imported  product  after which the  product can
move  within  the  countries  of the  customs  union  free  of duty.  As  each  member  of a
customs  union needs  to  apply the  same tariff,  it  follows  that one  country  cannot be  a
member of two customs unions.
In this situation,  members of a future  customs union (i.e.  COMESA) will not be able  to
offer  preferences  to  non-members  with whom  they  are  partners  in another  free  trade
5 This is not completely obvious, since SA's ascension as a leading regional exporter has coincided with the
end of the apartheid and the associated trade blockade.  Therefore, it could be the case that for some
products SA is indeed the world most competitive exporter.
10arrangement.  If COMESA  or EAC  become  a CU in 2004  as planned,  countries in those
organizations  that are also participating in the SADC FTA implementation program may
well be in violation of GATT Article XXIV if they seek to maintain preferential tariffs
for imports from the SADC countries.
Following  the  same  pattern,  for  Namibia  and  Swaziland,  their joint  membership  of
COMESA and SACU has become more acute now with the introduction of the COMESA
FTA.  These  countries  have  been  unable  to  implement  preferential  tariffs  for  other
COMESA  countries  and  cannot introduce  free  trade  for imports  from other COMESA
countries  in  terms  of the  FTA.  The  Common  External  Tariff  (CET)  of  the  SACU
agreement  cannot  be broken by some  members  granting  preferences  in terms of other
FTA regimes, unless  all the other members  give their consent.  Botswana  and  SA have
not given their consent to such action by Namibia and Swaziland, because once the CET
wall  is  broken  it  would  be very  difficult  to  prevent  goods  illegally  crossing  to other
SACU members without payment of duty.  This is probably also in violation of General
Agreement  on  Trade  and  Tariffs  (GATT)  Article  XXIV  paragraph  8  (a)  (ii).  This
situation is creating ambiguity over which RTA will prevail in practice.
Second,  a further manifestation of a conflicting  and confusing regional trade agenda has
to  do  with  the  rules  of origin  and  customs  procedures  embedded  in  the  agreements.
Different  trade  agreements  have  adopted  different  and  also  conflicting  rules of origin.
COMESA's  rules  of origin  apply  across  the board  and  are  based  on minimum  value
added requiring that local materials  constitute at least 35%  of the value added in order for
the product  to be considered  as local and therefore, benefit  from the preferential tariffs.
On the other hand, many SADC rules of origin are  sector specific,  and include specific
requirements  for different  sectors and products.  For example for textiles and  garments,
SADC  rules  of origin  require  a  double  transformation  in  order  to  qualify  for  tariff
preferences  -garments  must be made  from regionally produced  textiles,  fabric  must be
made from regional produced yams, yam must be made from uncarded, uncombed  fibre
or from chemical products.  Other example  of restrictive  rules of origin are Coffee, Tea
and  Spices  where  at  least  60 per cent by weight of the raw materials  must be wholly
originated in the region.
Such  restrictive  rules  of origin  are  very difficult  to  satisfy  for most  regional  garment
producers.  Some  of SADC  rules  of origin  are  still  pending  final  ratification  by  the
countries  and  there  are  a  few  sectors  whose  negotiations  are  still  ongoing.  EAC  is
currently  negotiating  the  rules  of origin  under  its planned  customs  union  based  on  a
combination of COMESA  and SADC ones.  The rules of origin that are most commonly
used at the moment by the operators across the region are those of COMESA, which have
the  advantages  of their simplicity,  low  verification  costs,  and  low protectionist  level.
However,  once  the  EAC  Customs  Union  is  in  place  and  SADC  rules  of origin  are
finalized,  potential  conflicting  and  confusing  situations  may  arise  over  which  trade
agreement  should  govern  trade  operations  within  the  region.  On  customs  procedures,
both SADC and COMESA have their own customs documentation,  further complicating
the situation.Implementation  is difficult for all countries belonging to more than one RTA because of
the complexity of obligations and wide variations  in rules of origin, tariff structure, non-
tariff barriers  (NTBs),  speed  of adjustment,  custom procedures,  etc.,  which  creates  an
uncertain  business  environment  that obstructs  investment  and marketing  decisions  and
elicits  corruption  and  bribery  practice  at the  borders.  Moreover,  the  management  and
administration of all these trade agreements  are becoming a heavy burden on the limited
institutional,  diplomatic and negotiating capacity and resources in member countries.
Solutions  to  this  "spaghetti  bowl"  are  not  easy.  The  necessary  rationalization  of the
regional  trade  agreements  should  ensure  that they  become  stepping  stones  to  greater
openness  and  development,  rather  than  vehicles  for  protection  and  unintended
inefficiency.  Rationalization  of the current situation through consolidation,  possibly in a
single arrangement,  is  something  that should be considered.  Sometimes  political  forces
against  regional integration  are  very strong  and a  radical  merger may not  be  possible.
However,  if merger is not yet politically  feasible,  countries  need to  focus on choices  of
design to minimize the economic costs of the present arrangements.  This would include
rapid progress on external liberalization and deepening and widening of the arrangements
to  lessen  the  risks  of  inefficient  trade  diversion  and  asymmetric  benefits.  Present
inconsistencies  need  to be eliminated through harmonization  of the features  adopted by
different  arrangements,  including  rules  of origin,  external  tariffs,  customs procedures,
product standards, and the speed of convergence.
Ultimately,  in the long run if all members of the RTAs in the  sub-region are to reap the
benefits  of their membership,  they should  move beyond  trade  arrangements,  like  free-
trade  areas  or  customs  unions,  towards  deeper  integration  schemes.  In  these  more
advanced ways of integration,  static trade liberalization gains  would not be the dominant
consideration, but rather deeper integration would focus on the potential  gains stemming
from increased  competitiveness  through  the  reduction  of administrative  and  transaction
costs, and other barriers to trade of goods, services, and cross-border movements of labor
and capital (Robson 1998).
4. The Cotonou Agreeinent and its implications for the regional trade agenda
One of the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement  signed between the European Union and
the African,  Caribbean  and Pacific  group  which  replaces  the Lom6  Convention,  is that
the  ACP member  states  enter  into  Economic  Partnership  Agreements  (EPAs)  with  the
European  Union,  either  individually  or  collectively,  taking  into  account  the  regional
integration processes already in existence.
Negotiations  of the EPAs  were  kicked  off on  September  27,  2002  and  should  end by
December  31,  2007.  EPAs  will  set  out  the  timetable  for  the  progressive  removal  of
barriers  to  trade  resulting in the establishment  of Free Trade  Areas  (FTA) between  the
EU  and ACP regional  groups  in accordance  with  the  relevant  WTO  rules.  Reciprocity
will be introduced gradually and asymmetrically,  with the EU removing most of its tariff
barriers  in a  short  period  of time,  with ACP tariff-dismantling  starting  in 2008  at  the
earliest.  Moreover,  EPA  arrangements  will  take  into  account  the level  of development
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adapt to the liberalisation process -this is what is called differentiation.  Negotiations will
therefore  be  as  flexible  as  possible  regarding  the  duration  of a  sufficient  transitional
period, the final product coverage,  sensitive sectors, and the degree of asymmetry, while
remaining in confonnity with WTO rules.
By 2006  there will be  a review  of the overall  progress  in negotiations  with a view  to
ensuring that negotiations  be  concluded in time to allow  EPAs to enter  into force  on  1
January,  2008  at  the  latest.  A  joint  ACP-EC  Ministerial  Trade  Committee  will
accompany the negotiations.
As a result EPAs will become the new agreements governing trade relations between the
EU and ACPs, but their aim goes well beyond the mere negotiation  and establishment of
free trade areas, to deal with trade-related  issues as well as development  aspects.  One of
the  reasons  for  the  phasing  out  of the  Lome  Convention  and  the  negotiation  of the
Cotonou  Agreement  is  the  widespread  perception  that  the  Lome  trade  arrangements,
which through the Generalized  System of Preferences  (GSP) offers generous preferential
access to EU markets, has not benefited most ACP countries.  This is due to the fact that
most ACP  countries  lack the productive  and technological  capacities,  marketing  skills,
transportation  channels,  and  appropriate  technical  and  sanitary  regulations  to  take
advantage of improved market access.
Hence,  the gradual  integration  of ACP into  the world  economy is  one  of the principal
important objectives of the partnership  between  the EU and the ACP, as reflected in the
Cotonou Agreement.  According  to  the European  Commission's  (EC)  guidelines  for the
EPAs  negotiations,  the  development  objective  is  a  key  component  of the  Cotonou
Agreement.  Indeed,  Article  XXXIV  (1)  of the Agreement  clearly  states  that economic
and trade cooperation between  ACP and the EU  "shall aim at  fostering the smooth and
gradual integration of ACP States into the world economy,  with  due regard to  their
political  choices  and  development  priorities,  thereby promoting  their  sustainable
development and contributing  to poverty eradication in the ACP countries". EPAs  are
therefore  an  attempt  to  make  use  of the existing  regional  integration  organizations  to
assist ACP countries to deal with many of the trade-related  and supply-side problems that
constrain their access to global markets.
Nevertheless,  whether the Cotonou and EPAs are the most suitable instruments for ACP
to  achieve  their  intended  goals  is  far  from  clear.  Numerous  authors  have  explicitly
criticized them for the risk and possible negative effects they may bring to ACP countries
in general and Africans in particular.  It has been claimed that ACP countries will not gain
many additional preferences  than those that they already  enjoy, while they will have to
actually  lower their tariffs  to EU products  which might have very serious consequences
for ACP.  In particular,  some authors  (Schiff 2002, Winters  2002),  argue that EPAs will
be trade diverting and will entail an important transfer of tariff revenues from ACP to EU
producers,  thus worsening  their  terms of trade  and  resulting in a net  welfare  loss.  The
reason being that since ACP imports from non-EU countries  still will have to pay tariffs,
prices are unlikely to fall and therefore EU producers  will capture the tariff revenue while
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impact of EPAs is likely to be negative (for a list of those studies,  see Schiff 2002).
Other arguments raised against EPAs relate to the large direct costs that their negotiation
and administration  will require for ACP countries, diverting scarce resources  from other
uses  like  customs  administration,  domestic  policy  resource  and  particularly  the
multilateral trade negotiations (Winters 2002).
While  these  arguments  should be  taken into  account  attention should  be shifted to the
negotiations6. Given  the fact that the Cotonou Agreement  has already been  signed in its
current  format,  and  as a  result EPAs will have to be negotiated,  focus  should now be
diverted to helping ACP countries  effectively negotiate.
In  this  context,  EPAs  can  provide  a  unique  opportunity  for the  ACP  countries  to re-
negotiate  fundamental  changes  to their trading  relationship  with the  EU and with  each
other. From the start,  it is clear that the EPAs will not simply focus on market access or
tariff  preference  issues.  In  fact,  as  we  saw,  EPAs  are  and  should  be  above  all,  a
development  instrument,  and as such, trade should be subordinated  to the developmental
objective.  Some  key  aspects  of  EPAs  that  have  to  be  re-negotiated  refer  to  trade-
facilitation  issues  such  as  rules  and  certificates  of origin  and  customs  procedures,  or
others  where  the  Cotonou  Agreement  provides  for  enhanced  technical  assistance  like
standards  and  quality  assurance  and  accreditation,  sanitary  and  phyto-sanitary
procedures,  and domestic regulation  issues involving competition norms and investment
policies. This will have important implications in two areas:
First,  re-negotiating  current  rules  of  origin  and  customs  procedures  can  have  a
particularly  tremendous  beneficial impact  for many ACP countries,  since they impose a
heavy burden on many  exporters  from developing  countries.  Recent  studies have shown
that,  due to  the inability to  comply with RoO, most EU imports from many developing
countries  which  are  eligible  for  preferential  treatment  under  the  System  of General
Preferences  (SGP)  actually enter the EU market under non-preferential  tariffs (Brenton
2003).  Therefore,  a  re-drafting  of these  regulations  for  ACP  countries,  towards  less
protectionist rules of origin and less stringent customs procedures  and technical  standards
could result in a rapid  increase of exports to EU markets.
Second, the  emphasis on non-tariff issues provides  an opportunity  for the ACP states to
link the negotiation  and  implementation of EPA's  to further regional  integration whilst
engaging with the intemational economy.  As mentioned, the Cotonou Agreement clearly
sets out that EPAs will build on regional integration initiatives existing within the ACPs,
at a level and in accordance  with procedures agreed by the ACPs. It is then envisaged that
there  will be  different  agreements  between  different regions,  and negotiations  will take
6  ne theoretical argument in favor of EPAs is that it belongs to the category of North-South agreements,
which, as recent literature suggests, leads to income convergence (World Bank 2000) and larger R&D
spillovers on productivity than South-South agreements (Schiff2002b).  This effects would be tempered by
the fact that in this case the EU, through the SGP system has already given free market access to most ACP
products.
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groups  of countries  already  engaged in a process  of regional  integration.  ACPs should
then decide  their preferred  geographical  configurations  before  negotiations  can start  in
earnest. In 2004, the situation of non-LDC ACP countries that do not consider themselves
to be in a position to enter into EPAs will be examined.
In summary, it is clear there are still many issues that need to be clarified if the region is
to have  meaningful negotiations  with the EU, compatible  with WTO regulations  and  in
line  with  the  development  objectives  of the  Cotonou  Agreement.  Some  of the  most
relevant ones are the following:
(i)  EPAs and  Everything But Arms Initiative (EBA):
The  so-called  Everything-but-Arms  Initiative  was approved  by the  European  Union in
February  2001.  It contemplates  the immediate elimination of all quotas  and duties on all
products  (free  access  for rice,  sugar  and bananas  will  be introduced  after  a transition
period)  except  arms  and ammunition  imported  into the EU  from  the world's  48  Least-
Developed Countries or LDCs.
The EBA initiative has, in general, been welcomed by the ACP LDC countries. There is,
however,  a  concern  in  some  countries  that  it  will make  it  more  difficult  to  negotiate
regional  EPAs  and  may well have weakened  the  African  regional  integration  process.
Allowing better access into EU markets  for LDCs compared to developing countries may
reduce  the  interest  of LDCs  to  join  with  other  developing  countries  in  a  regional
integration organisation to form an EPA. As all LDCs now have duty-free  access into the
European market, if an LDC prefers  to opt for a more shallow  form of integration with
the  EU,  this  improved  market  access,  coupled  with  resources  provided  under  the
European  Development  Fund,  may  satisfy  the  trade relation  requirements  of the  LDC
with the EU. If this is the case, there will be no incentive  for LDCs members of regional
agreements  to  enter  into  regionally-based  EPA  negotiations  with  the  European
Commission.  In  this  regard,  the  EU  has  already  accepted  that  the  least  developed
countries will not experience a decline in trade preferences  even in the event that they do
not  negotiate  an  EPA.  Here  lies  one of the  main  challenges  of EPAs -how to  make
differentiation  for some countries  compatible with the reinforcing  and consolidation  of
regional integration processes.
In the event that developing  countries  are unable  to  agree  on an EPA  as an alternative
trading arrangement,  it is  assumed that the EU would still  offer EBA treatment to their
imports. Despite this fact, there are a number  of important reasons why LDCs may want
to join the EPA negotiations.  First, EBA is an EU unilateral initiative and, as such, could
be unilaterally removed without negotiation or notification.
More importantly its rules of origin are less liberal than those currently applying to ACP
countries  under  the  Cotonou  Agreement  and  will  likely  be  even  more  restrictive  than
those negotiated in the EPAs.  In particular,  contrary to the Cotonou rules, EBA rules of
origin  do  not  allow  for  diagonal  cumulation  of intermediate  factors  between  ACP
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2001,  the  first  year  of the  initiative,  was  less  than  5%  of the  exports  eligible  for it
(Brenton 2003).  Most EBA  countries  prefer  to continue  exporting  to  the EU under the
Cotonou regulations,  but this will not be possible in the future unless they enter into  an
EPA with the EU. In fact, EPAs offer the possibility of negotiating  even simpler and less
protectionists rules of origin.
In addition,  EBA does not provide  for a comprehensive  package  of support  for regional
integration  and  economic  development  aimed  at  integrating  ACP  economies  into  the
world economy.
(ii) EPAs and WTO negotiatons
A number of areas to be addressed in EPAs are also on the WTO agenda that came out of
the Doha meeting,  which might reduce  even more  the incentives  for some  countries  to
engage  in EPAs.  There  is some  concern  in Africa that  EPA negotiations  will not bring
much  value  added  if the  same  issues  are  negotiated  simultaneously  under  the  WTO
umbrella.  Conversely,  if an  agreement  is  reached  under  EPAs  before  agreement  is
reached  in the WTO,  and if the decision reached  under EPA negotiations  is inconsistent
with  that  subsequently  reached  under  WTO,  it  is  assumed  that the  part  of the  EPA
agreement  which  is  inconsistent  with  the  WTO  decision  will need  to  be  renegotiated.
However,  there  are  some  advantages  to  engaging  in EPA  negotiations  instead  of the
multilateral  Doha Roumd.  In particular  in EPA negotiations,  ACP countries  or regional
groups  can  decide the  level  and procedures  more  appropriate  for their needs,  and will
have  more  leverage  than  in the  WTO.  Moreover,  EPA  negotiations  are  bound  to  a
specific time frame, whereas multilateral rounds can drag on.
(iii)  The implications for SACU
The SACU is an existing customs union and the EU has recently concluded  a Free Trade
Agreement  with South Africa,  which specifies  that the SACU  Common  External  Tariff
will be phased down for EU imports.  Therefore, the BLNS as members of SACU will be
defacto engaging in a reciprocal trade agreement with the EU through the FTA according
to modalities already  decided in the EU-SA  FTA. However,  BLNS market access to the
EU is governed  currently by the Cotonou Agreement,  and after 2008, by the result of the
EPA negotiations.  In ithe  event  that the BLNS  are  unable  to  agree to  an  EPA, Lesotho
would  continue  to  einjoy  unchanged  preferential  access  to  the  EU  under  the  EBA
initiative while Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland would (presumably)  revert  to current
GSP7 status.
The current situation, with a member of a Customs Union signing bilaterally a FTA with
another  country  is  clearly  anomalous  and  has  important  consequences  for  the  BLNS
countries.  On one hand, by reducing the tariff revenues  that SACU collects  as a whole the
SA-EU FTA reduces the current amount BLNS receive from the common SACU revenue
pool.  In fact,  this  is o:ne  of the main  reasons  for the recent  renegotiation  of the  SACU
revenue-distribution  formula in a way that is even more favorable to BLNS countries. On
' General System of Preferences
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a result of the EU-South Africa FTA is not consistent with the development objectives of
the Cotonou  Agreement  mentioned  above,  which  are based on asymmetric  concessions
and gradual integration of ACP into the world economy according to their needs. Yet, an
attempt from  the BLNS  countries  to  impose  strict controls  at  their borders  with  South
Africa to avoid triangulation of EU products entering their markets would be extremely
costly and would eliminate  many of the benefits derived from the free  flow of goods in
SACU.
It is therefore necessary to identify alternative  scenarios  for the BLNS.  One option is for
the  BLNS  to  ask  to join the EU-South  Africa  FTA.  This  has  many  advantages,  for  it
would  keep  all  SACU  members  in  one  agreement,  thus  removing  the  complexity  of
having one member of the SACU agreeing to a Free Trade Area with a third party. There
is some case  against this  solution on the basis that the EU-South Africa FTA took four
years  and  21  rounds  of talks  to  negotiate  and  hence,  the  final  outcome  represents  the
interests  of  both  parties  which  do  not  necessarily  coincide  with  those  of  BLNS.
Therefore,  it is been argued that a SACU-EU tariff dismantling should take into  account
the  interests  of the  BLNS.  There  are  at  least  three  arguments  against  the  latter:  first,
although  the  SA-EU  FTA  was negotiated  by  the  South African  Government,  regular
consultations  took place  during the  process with  the  BLNS  partners,  in  an attempt  to
address  their  main  concerns;  second,  reopening  negotiations  could  risk unraveling  the
Agreement  and would introduce a degree of uncertainty for investors. Finally, this option,
by splitting SACU countries  from the rest of SADC would put a break on SACU-SADC
regional integration, which goes against the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement.
A further option would be for the BLNS  to consider themselves party to a broader EPA
which would include the whole or part of Eastern and Southern Africa and that over time
would be aligned with the EU-SA  FTA.  This would allow  for the BLNS to negotiate  a
two-year  extension  on their  market  access  to the  EU (i.e.  from  2008-2010).  The  latter
would be consistent with their defacto phased removal of tariffs under the SA-EU FTA.
By remaining  outside the EU-SA FTA it allows  for the BLNS to enter into negotiations
on trade  facilitation  and  non-tariff issues  as part  of a broader  regional  EPA.  However,
looking  forward,  it  is easy  to expect  that  SACU's  neighbors  may be uneasy about  the
implications  of  joining in an EPA with Botswana,  Lesotho, Namibia or Swaziland due to
fears of leakage from the EU-SA FTA. In summary, there is not an obvious answer to the
question of how SACU agreement will fit into the forthcoming regional trade agenda.
(iv)  The problem of overlapping  and conflicting Regional Trade Agreements.
The inconsistencies  built into the various regional trade accords in Southern and Eastern
Africa, and in particular  the inconsistencies  mentioned  above between the trade regimes
of COMESA,  SADC, EAC and SACU, are one of the main constraints directly affecting
the  negotiations  of EPAs.  The  Cotonou  Agreement  explicitly  states  that  EPAs  should
take  into  account  the regional  integration  process  currently taking place.  However,  the
current  situation  of countries  offering  a  variety  of MFN,  preferential  and  potentially
common  external  tariffs,  makes  it difficult  to see how countries  or groups of countries
17belonging to several R.TAs can get together and negotiate a single- or a few EPAs- with
the  EU.  The  need for  harmonization  and  rationalization  is now  an imperative  for  the
region.
(v)  EPAs modalities of negotiations:
The Cotonou Agreement explicitly leaves to the ACP countries to decide on the level and
procedures  of the  EPA  trade  negotiations.  However,  purely for  logistical  reasons  it is
unlikely  that  the  EU  will  be  able  to  enter  into  many  negotiations  with  individual
countries,  while at the same time few ACP countries will have the capacity to enter into
negotiations  on their own with the  EU.  Therefore,  except  for perhaps  one  or two ACP
countries,  that  might  have  the  capacity  to  negotiate  on  their  own,  it  appears  that
negotiations will take place with several countries forming sub-regional groups.
It  is thus  widely accepted  that EPA  negotiations  will be  conducted  at two  levels:  the
issues common to most countries will be addressed  at the all-ACP level, whereas the sub-
region specific issues will be negotiated at the sub-regional level. This seems to be a good
approach,  allowing regions that are better prepared  and want to move faster to do so by
negotiating  separately with the EU.
One option for negotiations  at the sub-regional  level, would be for the negotiations  to be
conducted along the lines of the regional trade agreements.  However, lack of capacity on
the part of the regional organizations and the afore mentioned problem of the overlapping
memberships  and  contradictory  commitments  make  it  very  difficult  for  regional
organizations  to negotiate  EPAs  on behalf of their member  states.  For  example,  in the
case of SADC, it is doubtful that all its member states can negotiate as a group when ten
members out of 14 may be members of three different customs unions from 2004.
Moreover,  the  different  and  asymmetric  trade  relationship  that  countries  in  the  sub-
region  maintain  with  the EU  complicates  further  the  task of negotiating  EPAs on  the
basis of the existing  regional organizations.  For example,  it is not clear whether  SADC
Member States are  expected  to negotiate  as a group minus South Africa, since  (as noted
above) South Africa already has a legally binding trade agreement with the EU. The same
applies to COMESA with Egypt, which is not ACP country. Another unresolved issue is
what would happen  to  some countries  when they graduate  from LDC  status.  If the EU
decides  to discontinue  their duty free access  for them under the EBA initiative,  it is not
clear whether these countries would automatically join the existing EPAs that they might
not have negotiated.  On  the other hand,  it is doubtful that SADC or COMESA countries
that do not benefit from EBA or the EU-SA FTA will find it in their best interest to leave
negotiations  to either regional organization  whose majority members  might not have the
same interest in the EPA.  It is thus inconceivable  for SADC to  develop  an independent
negotiating  mandate  on  behalf  of its  Member  States  that  would  result  in  a  WTO
compatible Free Trade Area with the EU by 2020.
Once the possibility of negotiating by RTAs is ruled out, the critical issue is to decide on
a criterion for grouping the countries  in the region to be covered by the same EPA. The
18best outcome  for the region would be to negotiate  an EPA that  encompasses  as many
countries  as  possible, and if possible negotiate  a  single EPA for the whole region. The
countries of Eastern  and Southern Africa should join forces and try to use the opportunity
that  the EPA negotiations  bring about to generate  a political "Big Bang" signal that the
region is  moving firmly  in the direction  of regional  trade  liberalization  and integration
into the world  economy.  This "Big Bang" means  moving  steadily  towards a free  trade
area  for the whole ESA Region,  which then negotiates  an EPA with the EU.  A single
EPA  for southern  and  eastern  Africa  could be  envisioned  by 2008  provided  that,  at  a
minimum, the regional trade regimes are made compatible, and preferably harmonized. A
negotiating party involving  so many  countries  could be difficult  to manage,  but on the
other  hand,  it  would  definitively  wield  a  lot more  negotiating  leverage  vis a  vis the
European Union than several smaller fractioned  groups. Ultimately,  negotiating a single
EPA  that  encompasses  all  the regional  groupings  in  the  sub  region  would require  to
seriously  deal  with  the  overlapping  and  contradictory  commitments  embedded  in  the
RTAs. This would entail at the minimum the following:
*  The  regional grouping doing the negotiations should have  a structured and
compatible  trade framework with  a  free  trade  area  as  an  absolute  minimum,  and
preferably a customs union or at least harmonized  low extemal tariffs, so that there is less
danger  of trade  diversion  taking  place.  Several  of  the  regional  organizations  either
constitute  a customs union  or will be  customs  unions  (or  free trade  areas)  by the time
EPAs come into force so, theoretically, they could effectively join to negotiate EPA. For
example, if EAC and COMESA established the same Common Extemal Tariff this would
allow them to negotiate a joint EPA. For SADC, the implementation of a Customs Union
seems further down the road.  In this case, SADC (non-COMESA)  members should move
unilaterally  towards  aligning  their  MFN  tariffs  as  close  as  possible  to  those  of the
COMESA/EAC  Customs Union, thus reducing the scope for product triangulation taking
advantage  of the  tariff rate  differentials.  COMESA,  EAC  and  SADC  have  already
constituted joint task forces  at the technical  level to address  the problems  arising from
their differing  trade  agendas,  and therefore  what  is  needed  is  the political  impulse  to
move further down the path of harmonization that could very well arise from the urgency
of the  EPA negotiating  calendar.  Ideally, by the time  the  implementation  of the EPAs
start  in 2008,  ESA region  should have  achieved  a regional  free  trade  area  and  a high
degree of convergence  across countries  in their external tariffs.  This would simplify and
facilitate  the  negotiation  of  a  single  calendar  for  eliminating  tariffs  for  European
products.  Rather than negotiating  country by country or product by product,  one option
could be to agree on percentage tariff cuts across the board for all ESA countries with a
minimum and uniform number of products excluded.
*  Rules of origin should be harmonized among the RTAs towards  the simpler  and
less protectionist ones, and full diagonal  cumulation should be permitted in any potential
EU-ESA EPA so as to foster the use of regional inputs and creation of  backward linkages
across  the  region.  As  indicated,  Regional  Trade  Agreements  require  rules  of origin
because  different  tariffs are imposed on similar goods in accordance  with their origin of
"production".  However,  they are  often used as ways of hidden protectionism  inserted in
regional agreements.  Moreover,  they are becoming a source  of considerable  complexity
19and  confusion,  imposing  a  heavy  burden  on  customs  administrations  and  eliciting
corruption  and  rent-seeking.  Simplification,  harmonization  and diagonal  cumulation  of
rules of origin will therefore reduce the room for bribery and the administrative cost, and
encourage  local firms to use regional inputs in the production of their products.
*  Non-tariff barriers  to trade should be eliminated across Eastern and Southern
Africa.  This is a critical issue that has been neglected  to a large degree  in past regional
trade negotiations.  Yet, unless the multiple NTBs that the countries currently impose are
seriously tackled, there will not be significant increases in regional trade flows no matter
how much  tariffs  are  lowered.  NTBs  encompass  a wide  range  of issues  that  go  well
beyond pure trade matters,  such  as trade  finance and market information.  Here we refer
primarily to removing; border barriers,  which  implies streamlining  customs  procedures,
harmonizing  customs  documentation  and certificates  of origins,  and establishing  a well
functioning  single trarLsit-transport  regime with a regional transit-bond  guarantee system.
Also,  in  the  area of sanitary  and phyto-sanitary  (SPS)  measures  as  well  as  technical
standards  (TS)  to  trade,  countries  should  agree  to  stop  using  them  for  protectionist
purposes.  Since  full harmonization would be a costly and lengthy process,  governments
could work  towards  a regional  agreement  on mutual recognition  on SPS  and TS.  The
main  transport  corridors  that currently  carry most of the international  trade within  the
region,  like  the  Maputo  corridor  or  the  Northern  Corridor  linking  Mombassa  to
Bujumbura  present  the  ideal  framework  to  start  implementing  these  measures.  The
agenda described would be expensive and the question of funding is critical. Multilateral
and bilateral  donors  are already funding  transit and trade facilitation projects  across  the
region  and,  if the  political  decisions  to  eliminate  NTB  were  taken,  they  could  be
mobilized to step up their financial support and expertise in favor of  this agenda.
The  agenda above  describes  a number  of unresolved  issues  in the regional  integration
process that need to be dealt with urgently,  and which will require  the  strong political
commitment that has been lacking in the past. Indeed, most RTAs in ESA have not been
really effective in advancing regional  integration and promoting trade  and development
because ultimately,  in spite of their rhetoric, countries  were not always  fully committed
to the regional  agendas and the implementation of treaties has been sluggish at best and
simply  non-existent  in  some  cases.  During  the  last  few  years  there  has  been  a  re-
launching of regional trade initiatives  with some  significant achievements,  as witnessed
by the launching of the COMESA FTA, the signing of the SADC Trade Protocol and the
negotiation  to  re-establish  the  former  EAC  Customs  Union.  Yet,  even  in  these  cases
progress  is still very slow;  only half of the COMESA  countries  participate  in the FTA;
SADC  trade  protocol  is  still  not  in place;  and  in the  EAC  case,  while  countries  are
negotiating  a customs  union they still impose surcharges  and suspended  duties on their
bilateral trade.
The  market  fragmentation  and  low  demand  of most  countries  in  the  region  makes
regional  economic  integration  an  appropriate  means  for promoting  intra-regional  trade
and accelerating  growth  and structural  transformation  through  economic  diversification.
Yet, the main reason that lies behind the lack of commitment  to the regional integration
process  is the  continuous  focus of many countries  on the costs that it imposes,  and the
20misgivings  about  the  opportunities  it could bring  about.  Many  governments  see  it as  a
zero-sum  game whereby  what  a  country  achieves  in terms of market  access  is  at  the
expense of the neighbor,  which translates  into deep reluctance to open domestic  markets
to  regional  partners.  Lack  of commitment  also  explains  to  a  large  extent  why  most
countries belong to more than one RTA, with little consideration to their conflicting trade
schedules and regimes, many of which ultimately will not be implemented.
Notwithstanding,  the Cotonou Agreement presents a window of opportunity to overcome
all these political obstacles and advance firnly the regional integration process in Eastern
and  Southern  Africa.  As  explained,  EPAs  offer  all  ACP  countries  the  possibility of a
serious  improvement  in  the relations  with  the  EU.  But  Eastern  and  Southern  Africa
needs to do its homework first, because unless ESA countries take decisive steps towards
deeper  integration,  including rationalization  and hannonization  of the current "spaghetti
bowl" of regional trade agreements,  it is very doubtful  that they will be in a position to
negotiate a single EPA encompassing  all of them. If this is the case, there is a great risk
that the whole  process will  fail or that the countries  will  embark  on several  fractioned
negotiations  with the EU, that  ultimately will not produce the beniefits  that EPAs could
potentially  generate.  Governments  will have  to  show political  leadership  to  move  this
agenda  forward and fully harness  all the potential benefits that EPAs present.  This is too
good an opportunity for Africa to miss.
5. Conclusions
The RTAs that have proliferated in Eastern and Southern Africa can, if properly designed
and effectively  implemented,  be an important instrument  to assist the member countries
in increasing their current low trade links and integrating with global markets. The reality
is  nonetheless,  that  these  arrangements  are  characterized  by  their  multiple  and
overlapping  membership,  and  complex  structures  - and  eventually  conflicting  and
confusing commitments.  Past attempts to rationalize  and harmonize the current Regional
Trade Agreements  have failed because ultimately many countries  were not committed to
regional integration  and more generally to trade liberalization,  and they did not see clear
benefits from the rationalization.
However,  the  Cotonou  Agreement  provides  an  excellent  and  decisive  window  of
opportunity for the region to organize  itself and to harness the benefits  stemming  from
the  future  Economic  Partnership  Agreements.  EPAs  offer  all  ACP  countries  the
possibility of a complete overhaul of trade relations with the EU in a way that could have
serious  benefits  for  them.  It  has  been  argued  that  EPAs  may  weaken,  rather  than
strengthen, the regional integration process in Southern Africa as it will force countries to
decide  on regional  configuration  and  a  common  negotiating  mandate.  It is  not  EPAs
which will force this issue,  but the internal  contradictions  of the regional  trade  accords
themselves.  In  fact,  the  benefits  accruing  from  the  Cotonou  Agreement  and  EPA
negotiations are so important that they can be the external driving force that will push the
regional organizations to rationalize and harnonize their trade regimes.
21Therefore, unless ESA. countries reform and harmonize their regional trade agreements  in
a way that will permit the negotiation  of a single EPA for the whole region,  there is a
great risk that negotialions will fail or multiple negotiations will take place by subgroups
of countries and,  as a consequence,  they will not produce the results expected Africa will
then  miss  the  opportunity  to  improve  its  integration  into  the  world  economy.
Governments  will have  to  show  political  leadership  to move  this  agenda  forward  and
fully harness the potential benefits that EPAs present.
22ACRONYMS  AND  ABBREVIATIONS
ACP  Africa, Caribbean, Pacific group
BLNS  Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland
CBI  Cross-Border Initiative (See RIFF)
CEMAC  Communaute Economique  et Monetaire de l'Afrique Centrale
CET  Common External Tariff
CMA  Common Monetary Area
COMESA  Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CU  Customs Union
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC  East African Community
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African  States
EDF  European Development Fund
EC  European Commission
EPA  Economic Partnership Agreement
ESA  Eastern and Southern Africa Region
EU  European Union
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment
FTA  Free Trade Area
GATT  General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IOC  Indian Ocean Commission
LDC  Least Developed Country
NTB  Non-Tariff Barriers
RTA  Regional Trade Arrangement
RIFF  Regional Integration Facilitation Forum
RoO  Rules of Origin
SA  South Africa
SACU  Southern Africa Customs Union
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SGP  System of Generalised Preferences
SPS  Sanitary and Phito-sanitary Measures
TS  Technical Standards
USA  United States of America
WAEMU  West African Economic and Monetary Union
WB  World Bank
WTO  World Trade Organization
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